Shelby composed a blog post about the relative importance of an ethic being intuitive, and begins by asking just how important it is. I would like to offer my opinion on that matter.
The most important goal, when faced with a seemingly intractable problem, is clarification, and as such, the most important clarification in this instance, I think, is the question: important for what? Is intuitive credibility important for the viability of an ethical theory? Or is intuitive credibility important in order to get people to follow said theory? Ideally, viability would necessarily lead to a following, but alas, things are not so ideal.
My intuition (forgive me) is that intuitive credibility may make an ethical theory more appealing, more accessible, and easier to follow, but it is rather irrelevant to the moral viability and credibility of the theory itself.
I do so humbly believe that morality is objectively based and with the proper amount of investigation, an appropriately ethical code can be offered. There are actions that are right, and there are actions that are wrong. Yes, there are many who object to this and I welcome such protestations. If I am right, however, as I suspect that I am, the intuitive credibility of an ethical theory should not matter. If it can be objectively demonstrated, than how people first feel about a theory has little significance.
There is right and there is wrong; the niche of intuition is insubstantial.
Wednesday, December 15, 2010
Conflating Killing and Eating
I operate under no moral obligation of vegetarianism; however, I am morally obliged to refrain from lending support and validity to nigh any practice of killing an animal for food. This distinction, while seemingly counterintuitive is predicated by the possibility of consuming meat, contra vegetarianism, without violating the moral status due to animals. While the respect of this moral status is often manifested by a moratorium on the consumption of meat, such abeyance is not a necessary condition thereof.
It is morally wrong to inflict death upon another sentient being to fulfill a flittingly unnecessary desire. The conditions under which most animals are kept and killed compound this moral obligation by the actualization of excessive cruelty. Even so, not all instances of eating meat begotten under such conditions are morally unacceptable. Actually, the very act of consumption is very rarely unacceptable. It would be fitting now to transition from the theoretical to the practical. To purchase meat is to financially support an industry that constantly violates the moral status of animals. The consumption of mean, once purchased, is not. If meat were accidentally introduced to a vegetarian dish at a restaurant, the customer would have no moral obligation to discard the food.
The consumption of meat is often de facto tantamount, morally, to purchasing the meat. However, within the narrow possible parameters of their separation, refraining from consuming meat is no more than symbolic, and is certainly no moral obligation.
It is morally wrong to inflict death upon another sentient being to fulfill a flittingly unnecessary desire. The conditions under which most animals are kept and killed compound this moral obligation by the actualization of excessive cruelty. Even so, not all instances of eating meat begotten under such conditions are morally unacceptable. Actually, the very act of consumption is very rarely unacceptable. It would be fitting now to transition from the theoretical to the practical. To purchase meat is to financially support an industry that constantly violates the moral status of animals. The consumption of mean, once purchased, is not. If meat were accidentally introduced to a vegetarian dish at a restaurant, the customer would have no moral obligation to discard the food.
The consumption of meat is often de facto tantamount, morally, to purchasing the meat. However, within the narrow possible parameters of their separation, refraining from consuming meat is no more than symbolic, and is certainly no moral obligation.
Friday, December 10, 2010
Sociopathic Stake in Science
"It's good for science."
We've all heard it. Actions of all kinds are legitimized by the inherent sociopolitical awe invoked by the word 'science' rendering it, ironically, to quasi religious status. But what is it about science that so drives us and allows us to turn our heads to some of the greater atrocities? We torture animals, why? To get a return on our investment down the road? Its not even that concrete, we torture animals for the potential to receive a benefit. We don't phrase it that way, because that would be bad politics. "We torture animals so we might get some useful knowledge later." "We test on animals for the sake of science, and science cured small pox." There is a significant difference in the two articulations of the same thing. Not all tests are small pox tests. There needs to be a more tangible benefit if we are to subject animals to such treatment, and there rarely is.
"It's good for science." I'm sure Joseph Mengele had a similar view.
Question: is the use of the term "science" a deliberate cover act to justify wrong actions?
We've all heard it. Actions of all kinds are legitimized by the inherent sociopolitical awe invoked by the word 'science' rendering it, ironically, to quasi religious status. But what is it about science that so drives us and allows us to turn our heads to some of the greater atrocities? We torture animals, why? To get a return on our investment down the road? Its not even that concrete, we torture animals for the potential to receive a benefit. We don't phrase it that way, because that would be bad politics. "We torture animals so we might get some useful knowledge later." "We test on animals for the sake of science, and science cured small pox." There is a significant difference in the two articulations of the same thing. Not all tests are small pox tests. There needs to be a more tangible benefit if we are to subject animals to such treatment, and there rarely is.
"It's good for science." I'm sure Joseph Mengele had a similar view.
Question: is the use of the term "science" a deliberate cover act to justify wrong actions?
Animal Engineering
Todd mentioned in one of his posts: "It's probably safe to say that no animal would actually desire to be genetically engineered in any way. They have lived happy and content lives for thousands of years without such interference. It's ludicrous and pretty arrogant to think we could help in any way."
I wanted to take slight issue with this claim. I do not think it is safe to say that no animal would desire to be genetically engineered in any way. There are humans that would be willing to undergo such processes, so why is it safe to claim that no non-human animal, given all the information wouldn't opt likewise? It is not arrogant to think that we can help animals, though thinking that we know what animals want may very well be.
Todd also asked "Is transgenesis and animal experimentation an abuse of moral agent status?"
Unfortunately, I think it comes down to a matter of intent. If transgenesis is conducted for the sole purpose of human benefit, than yes, a very good argument could be made for this violation, but performing an action, any action, to benefit not the moral agents, but the moral patients (e.g. non-human animals) is a different matter. Perhaps an actualization of transgenesis reduced the suffering of a particular animal in the long term, than why would this be an abuse of moral agent status? Yes there was pain and suffering immediately, but for an ultimately better long term good.
Question: It is erroneous to assume that the animal would select such experimentation for itself, but it is also erroneous to assume that it would not. Given this, is there criteria other than the benefit of the animals to take into account?
I wanted to take slight issue with this claim. I do not think it is safe to say that no animal would desire to be genetically engineered in any way. There are humans that would be willing to undergo such processes, so why is it safe to claim that no non-human animal, given all the information wouldn't opt likewise? It is not arrogant to think that we can help animals, though thinking that we know what animals want may very well be.
Todd also asked "Is transgenesis and animal experimentation an abuse of moral agent status?"
Unfortunately, I think it comes down to a matter of intent. If transgenesis is conducted for the sole purpose of human benefit, than yes, a very good argument could be made for this violation, but performing an action, any action, to benefit not the moral agents, but the moral patients (e.g. non-human animals) is a different matter. Perhaps an actualization of transgenesis reduced the suffering of a particular animal in the long term, than why would this be an abuse of moral agent status? Yes there was pain and suffering immediately, but for an ultimately better long term good.
Question: It is erroneous to assume that the animal would select such experimentation for itself, but it is also erroneous to assume that it would not. Given this, is there criteria other than the benefit of the animals to take into account?
Saturday, December 4, 2010
A Cause for Action
We have been discussing the effect that religion has on the moral decisions the religious often make in regard to animals. Specifically, I am thinking of the appeals to scripture used to defend vegetarian and non-vegetarian diets. This has left a nagging question behind:
Two people convert to a vegan lifestyle, and one does not. The first (we'll call her Elisha) converted to veganism because she believes it wrong to kill an animal to provide humans with non-essentials such as meat in our diet and leather gloves on our hands. The second (we'll call her Kim) converts to be a vegan because there is, in her opinion, enough evidence in the scriptures to demonstrate that it was god's plan. The third, who did not convert, is only relevant in her existence and shall therefore go nameless. My question is, is there a moral difference between the two? Both Elisha and Kim have done the right thing but only one for the (dare I say so) right reason. It would seem that both Elisha and Kim are morally superior to she-who-shall-not-be-named, but is Elisha superior, morally, to Kim? Where lies this hierarchy of morality?
Question: Does the reason for committing the right act morally matter?
Two people convert to a vegan lifestyle, and one does not. The first (we'll call her Elisha) converted to veganism because she believes it wrong to kill an animal to provide humans with non-essentials such as meat in our diet and leather gloves on our hands. The second (we'll call her Kim) converts to be a vegan because there is, in her opinion, enough evidence in the scriptures to demonstrate that it was god's plan. The third, who did not convert, is only relevant in her existence and shall therefore go nameless. My question is, is there a moral difference between the two? Both Elisha and Kim have done the right thing but only one for the (dare I say so) right reason. It would seem that both Elisha and Kim are morally superior to she-who-shall-not-be-named, but is Elisha superior, morally, to Kim? Where lies this hierarchy of morality?
Question: Does the reason for committing the right act morally matter?
Work Animals
Shelby: Can we use animals without abusing them?
Most of the responses to this question have dealt with the effects of using animals, and I am typically tentative to follow along that road, for even morally wrong actions can yield benefits, so it is often misleading to judge an action by its consequences. But on the other hand, it is difficult to imagine a deontological dilemma if the action does not result in harm of any kind.
Matt is right, of course, that perhaps both our lives and the lives of the animals would be worse if we were not to use animals. He is right also that the respectful and caring behavior of an "I-thou" relationship could be the basis of moral acceptability. To draw a weak analogy, there were slaves that were treated with a measure (to varying degrees) of decency, care, and respect. This does not serve as a measure of the permissibility of slavery.
Essentially, the possible non-harm consequences does not necessarily permit any action. Just because no harm may come from a particular instance does not mean that we should do it. Does using animals always abuse them, no. Does that mean we should use animals? I do not think so.
Question: How is the morality of an act to be determined if not from the consequences of the action?
Most of the responses to this question have dealt with the effects of using animals, and I am typically tentative to follow along that road, for even morally wrong actions can yield benefits, so it is often misleading to judge an action by its consequences. But on the other hand, it is difficult to imagine a deontological dilemma if the action does not result in harm of any kind.
Matt is right, of course, that perhaps both our lives and the lives of the animals would be worse if we were not to use animals. He is right also that the respectful and caring behavior of an "I-thou" relationship could be the basis of moral acceptability. To draw a weak analogy, there were slaves that were treated with a measure (to varying degrees) of decency, care, and respect. This does not serve as a measure of the permissibility of slavery.
Essentially, the possible non-harm consequences does not necessarily permit any action. Just because no harm may come from a particular instance does not mean that we should do it. Does using animals always abuse them, no. Does that mean we should use animals? I do not think so.
Question: How is the morality of an act to be determined if not from the consequences of the action?
Sunday, November 21, 2010
Legal Subjects
Shelby Giaccarini made a presentation this October concerning the legal status of animals. In it, she called for an intermediate group to be considered under law. We currently operate with legal things and legal persons, but this neglects many cases that do not fall properly within these two categories. So she proposed that we develop a group called legal subjects that would deserve some rights but not all.
This approach seems far superior to attempting to bestow upon animals the status of personhood. Not only is this idea alien enough to not be viable in this particular political landscape, but it is still unclear what granting personhood would actually do. Which of our rights are begotten by personhood, and which are not?
Perhaps we need to start with not treating them as property and going from there. But this is still an unnecessary complication. The category of legal subjects would avoid the apparent equalizing that calling them people would have. Yes, I know that there are those that wish to claim that we are equal to animals, but we are not. If there is any objectively agreed upon point, it is that.
Which is the better route to take? Do we call animals people, or do we fashion them a new category?
This approach seems far superior to attempting to bestow upon animals the status of personhood. Not only is this idea alien enough to not be viable in this particular political landscape, but it is still unclear what granting personhood would actually do. Which of our rights are begotten by personhood, and which are not?
Perhaps we need to start with not treating them as property and going from there. But this is still an unnecessary complication. The category of legal subjects would avoid the apparent equalizing that calling them people would have. Yes, I know that there are those that wish to claim that we are equal to animals, but we are not. If there is any objectively agreed upon point, it is that.
Which is the better route to take? Do we call animals people, or do we fashion them a new category?
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