Johnson recently made the comment in class: "Just because you can provide a behavioristic explanation for the actions of animals does not mean you should, it does not mean that it is the best explanation." This, by the way, is not verbatim, only how I remember it.
I think this is a valid question, but a question with an equally valid rebuttal. The behavioristic response is just that, a response. The animal rights theorists will make a statement similar to: "Well the dog yelps when it is hit, therefore it can feel pain." or rather "The dolphin saved a human so it obviously has empathy, or the capacity for complex thoughts and emotions." The behaviorist, I think to be charitable, is objecting to the certainty with which these comments are often made. It is possible that due to these similarities to human actions they possess consciousness and other complex processes, but that is not the only possible conclusion that can be drawn.
The behaviorist may not even think that his explanation is the best, or the most likely, only that it is possible, and as long as it is possible the animal rights theorists may want to instill into their rhetoric a modest modicum of fallibility.
Question: Do the theories of the behaviorists generate ramifications for the consciousness of humans? In other words, can the behaviorist's contentions be applied to humans in a reductio ad absurdum argument?
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